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Abstract. Modern societies are increasingly threatened by disasters that require 
rapid response through ad-hoc collaboration among a variety of actors and or-
ganizations. The complexity within and across today’s societal, economic and 
environmental systems defies accurate predictions and assessments of damages, 
humanitarian needs, and the impact of aid. Yet, decision-makers need to plan, 
manage and execute aid response under conditions of high uncertainty while be-
ing prepared for further disruptions and failures. This paper argues that these 
challenges require a paradigm shift: instead of seeking optimality and full effi-
ciency of procedures and plans, strategies should be developed that enable an 
acceptable level of aid under all foreseeable eventualities. We propose a deci-
sion- and goal-oriented approach that uses scenarios to systematically explore 
future developments that may have a major impact on the outcome of a deci-
sion. We discuss to what extent this approach supports robust decision-making, 
particularly if time is short and the availability of experts is limited. We inter-
lace our theoretical findings with insights from experienced humanitarian deci-
sion makers we interviewed during a field research trip to the Philippines in the 
aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. 
Keywords: Disaster response, humanitarian information management, robust 
decision support, risk management, preparedness, sensemaking. 
1 Introduction 
Five weeks after Typhoon Haiyan had made landfall on the Philippines, we lead a 
small research team to carry out an on-site investigation of the humanitarian response, 
and in particular of the impact of information on sensemaking and decision making. 
In the course of our journey, we interviewed 35 decision makers from the United 
Nations (UN), non-governmental organizations or local government, attended nation-
al and local coordination meetings and observed field operations. One compelling 
finding from this fieldwork was the recognition that humanitarian decision making 
should be driven by the aim to understand emerging risks and to share information 
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about them in due time and accessible format. As Jesper Lund, Head of Office for the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the severely 
affected town of Tacloban stated:  
 
“Managing disasters means to understand what the risks are as they emerge: pre-
vent acceleration of trends that can turn into a disaster.” 
 
In this paper we will outline the challenges for humanitarian information manage-
ment to support such real-time identification and management of emerging risks by 
focusing on two questions:  
1. How should an information system be designed for sensemaking and decision sup-
port in sudden onset disasters?  
2. How to steer the exploration of a complex system such that the aims of the infor-
mation system can be achieved while respecting constraints in terms of time and 
resources available?  
2 Humanitarian Information Management 
In the response to Haiyan, the importance of information management has been wide-
ly recognized. In most organizations, information management officers (IMOs) work 
to collect data and convert it into information products, most often a situation report 
or a map. These information products by their very nature mostly provide a snapshot 
of the situation; they do not convey analyses or a deeper understanding of the situa-
tion and important trends. IMOs try to keep pace with the requests of a plethora of 
different policy- and decision-makers to satisfy aid organizations, donors, govern-
ments, the military, from international to local levels. The multitude of organizations 
and decisions, the divergence of needs, information sources, temporal and geographi-
cal scales, bandwidth constraints and a virtually unlimited variety of information that 
were openly shared with the whole world, create a frantic pattern of constant requests, 
surveys, questionnaires, reports and maps pushed from headquarters to the field and 
back. Marc McCarthy, a member of the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination 
(UNDAC) team and deployed in one of the worst hit areas within days after the Ty-
phoon’s landfall expressed the resulting confusion and irritation among responders 
bluntly and succinctly:  
“This is the Information Disaster.” 
Due to the nature of sudden onset disasters and the ad hoc character of the re-
sponse, no model can be developed to timely explain and predict the behavior of the 
disrupted socio-economic system or the consequences of decisions on how and where 
to intervene (DiMario et al. 2009). Therefore, information management in sudden 
onset disasters should acknowledge that decisions need to be made in near real-time 
based on uncertain and lacking information about the impact of the disaster. Instead 
of seeking optimality, this decision-centered approach aims to prevent that essential 
goals cannot be reached.  
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2.1 Decision Support in Humanitarian Disaster Response 
How humans approach a decision depends on the information and understanding of the 
systems that affect the results of decisions. Under stress and pressure, we mostly follow 
intuitive rules (Gigerenzer et al. 2012), which emphasizes the importance of training 
and professional experience to avoid the most common judgmental biases. To capture 
expert knowledge, scientists tend to abstract and model parts of the overall problem. 
Disasters, however, pose complex problems that largely defy such simplifications. 
Complexity and uncertainty are certainly not new aspects of decision-making (Rit-
tel & Webber 1973). Yet as organizations and individuals increasingly rely on models 
for data processing and on Information Systems to share information, decision-makers 
operate in circumstances that are more difficult than ever before, while they struggle 
to maintain oversight and control. Turoff, Chumer, Van de Walle and Yao (2004) 
presented the Dynamic Emergency Response Management Information System 
(DERMIS) framework for information system design and development that addresses 
communication, information and decision-making needs of responders to emergen-
cies. As Turoff et al. (2004) stated, the unpredictable nature of a crisis implies that the 
exact actions and responsibilities of possibly geographically dispersed individuals and 
teams cannot be pre-determined. Therefore, an information system should be able to 
support reassigning decision power to where the action takes place, but also the re-
verse flow of accountability and status information upward and sideways throughout 
any responding organization. 
2.2 Wicked Problems  
In policy-making, the term ‘wicked problem’ has been coined to refer to problems that 
are characterized by fundamental uncertainty about the nature, scope and behavior of 
the involved systems (Van Bueren et al. 2003; Weber & Khademian 2008). Sudden 
onset disasters confront decision-makers with wicked problems that are further com-
plicated as a disaster entails a catastrophic event generating dramatic impacts that can 
propagate rapidly through the system (Rasmussen 1997). 
The way to understand and analyze a wicked problem depends on the decision-
makers’ ideas about issues and possible solutions (Rittel & Webber 1973). In litera-
ture, wicked problems have hardly been addressed systematically, as there is no  
standard solution nor algorithm (Coyne 2005). Some approaches aim at adapting 
knowledge-based models to consider uncertainty and complexity by decomposing the 
overall system into sub-systems that are modeled separately (Rasmussen 1997). By 
neglecting interdependencies, important aspects associated to the emergence and in-
terplay of systems are ignored (Pich et al. 2002) leading to inadequate models and 
flawed expectations regarding both the actual consequences and the manageability of 
the problem.  
Therefore, approaches need to be developed that embrace the lack of situational 
awareness, resources and time, particularly in the early phases of a disaster. We pro-
pose to support decision-makers to structure information for decisions and explore 
consequences rather than relying on models. Such ‘soft’ approaches are considered as 
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‘probe, sense and respond’ to test a system’s reaction to an intervention instead of a 
model-based ‘analyze and respond’ (Mingers & Rosenhead 2004).  
In the response to sudden onset disasters, information management should be tar-
geted at facilitating collaboration between the many organzations and actors involved. 
The process should systematically identify and reveal information that has the most 
significant implications for disaster response – on an individual, organizational and 
regional level. In the words of UN OCHA Head of Office Jesper Lund: 
“I only look at issues, not at numbers.” 
The ultimate challenge in wicked problems is making good decisions on the basis 
of lacking or inadequate information. The notion of a ‘good’ decision must be re-
interpreted in this context: plans and projects should not be ranked on the basis of 
their performance at a given (static) point in time. Typically, the dynamics play an 
important role, as the evolution of the situation, the information available about the 
problem and the understanding of it continously change. Re-planning ‘en cours de 
route’ is often required (Benjaafar et al. 1995). Therefore, good probing should aim at 
the identification of drivers that considerably change the performance and ranking of 
alternatives. Information management should enable monitoring the situation, making 
sense of it and acting upon the (new) understanding (Pich et al. 2002). 
2.3 Risk Accelerators as Basis for Information Management 
There is a plethora of definitions of ‘risk’ depending on the context and purpose of 
use (Frosdick 1997). Although the term is used frequently in day-to-day language and 
seems to be understood, risks are perceived and judged very differently. Still, most 
authors agree that risk addresses the (positive or negative) consequences of a situa-
tion, an event, a decision or any kind of combination thereof and the probability of the 
consequences occurring (Fishburn 1984; Haimes et al. 2002).  
The notion of risk is most prominent in financial corporations. Financial risk is usual-
ly determined by the variance or volatility of expected returns (Rippel & Teply 2011). 
Further measures focusing on losses comprise different value-at-risk measures that can 
be used to describe the extent of uncertainty and its related harm. Following this ratio-
nale, international engineering standards such as ISO 14971 define the risk associated to 
an event as the product of the event’s probability and harm (Rakitin 2006).  
Most approaches to risk management start with an assessment, i.e., the identifica-
tion of potential risk sources or events, the assessment of those events’ likelihood and 
consequences (Renn 2005). This leads to a focus on ‘frequent’ or chronic failures that 
are part of the annual or quarterly reporting. Emerging risks or outliers are typically 
not considered, and therefore not monitored, controlled and managed. 
Organizations that are operating under high-risk circumstances should be very vigi-
lant on avoiding risks resulting in incidents, because their occurrence would have 
disastrous consequences for the organization itself or the public. “High Reliability 
Organizations” (HROs) are organizations that operate under these trying conditions 
and succeed in having less than their fair share of accidents (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). Processes in HROs focus on failure rather than success, inertia as well as 
change, tactics rather than strategy, the present rather than the future, and resilience as 
well as anticipation (Weick et al., 1999). 
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Figure 1 shows the evolution of the performance of a risk system σ as a function of 
the environment. The performance of the system σ is defined by two characteristics: 
(i) the potential losses, measured in terms of the performance difference between a 
satisficing and other potential states; performance can be understood in terms of qua-
litative and quantitative aims such as economic growth, stability, security, etc.; and 
(ii) the steepness of decline when the environment changes. As the environment can-
not be captured or described in its full complexity, we focus on a set x of impact fac-
tors xi that characterize the environment: x=[x1,…,xN]. The impact factors xi do not 
necessarily evolve independently or continuously; shocks such as natural hazards may 
result in jumps or major disruptions. How x’s values actually may or might develop 
over time needs to be modeled and represented in the scenarios. 
We now define risk drivers as those components xi of x whose change leads to a 
steep decrease of the σ’s performance. How steep the decline must be to consider xi to 
be a risk driver depends on the perception and preferences of decision makers. Ideal-
ly, the set of scenarios should enable them to understand and monitor all risk drivers, 
but this is usually not feasible given restrictions in time and resources; and limitations 
in knowledge. To identify the most relevant risk drivers, we propose to identify fac-
tors that are driving or triggering changes in the σ’s performance and impact the eval-
uation of the decision alternatives.  
Good risk management should develop strategies to avoid patterns that may 
(quickly) lead to undesired consequences. As illustrated in Figure 1, system σi (in 
black) requires a mitigation reaction that corresponds to small changes in the envi-
ronment to avoid potential large losses initiated by risk driver x. For system σj (in 
grey), the consequences of a small deviation are less severe. Depending on x’s devel-
opment there may be more time to recognize the development and act accordingly. 
Ultimately, it is the aim to change a system’s behavior by exerting controls such that 
it is less prone to failure and substantial loss. 
Due to the dynamics of complex systems, it is crucial to understand the patterns 
and relations that steer the system’s behavior while these are emerging. When con-
fronted with lacking information, there is a tendency to assume that relations can be 
controlled and behave similar to what is known about the system. Uncertainty is then 
simply added by assuming a limited variance (Draper 1995).  
Our concept of risk recognizes that it is impossible to describe all possibly relevant 
components of x and model their consequences with respect to the system’s perfor-
mance. Ergo, ‘risk’ is largely a relative concept depending on the current knowledge 
and organizational or societal preferences and goals. Taking a relevance- instead of 
likelihood driven perspective, we advocate to systematically uncover relevant scena-
rios by using techniques from information management and decision support, such 
that systems can be designed that are less prone to substantial losses in any situation. 
3.1 Exploration of Complexity through Scenarios 
Data interpreted in the context of a disaster will result in assumptions about its possi-
ble or likely evolution. Systematically constructing scenarios that challenge current 
mind sets supports probing by helping decision-makers to explore the consequences 
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of their actions against events that may happen and are sufficiently plausible to be 
envisioned (Wright & Goodwin 2009). Scenarios can be used to plan for possible 
future humanitarian needs, to steer the assessment to the most critical issues and to 
create common situation awareness among key stakeholders. By their very nature, 
scenarios represent diverging paths of the disaster’s possible evolution, and can hence 
also be used as a means to build consensus or compare the impact of different as-
sumptions, forecasts or models on the response planning and strategy. In this sense, 
they can be used as a tool to embrace different opinions rather than aggregating and 
averaging them, or choosing just one specific opinion.  
Scenarios should address the information needs of decision-makers. Especially at 
the initial phase of a disaster, the need to act is greatest, yet the least information 
about what has happened is available. Decisions made in these early stages have con-
sequences for months and years. At a recent UN Workshop on information needs of 
humanitarian decision makers, the information requirements were categorized into 
seven categories: context and scope; humanitarian needs; capacity and response plan-
ning; operational situation; coordination and institutional structures; internal; and 
looking forward. Within each of these categories specific questions or kinds of re-
quired information were provided (Gralla, Goentzel & Van de Walle 2012). As the 
resulting extensive list of requirements shows, decision-makers prefer to obtain all 
relevant observations and information that is available in order to make a decision that 
reflects the reality of the given situation. Once they know they have all relevant in-
formation that is available before they have to make a decision, they can move to 
sensemaking, which allows them to design response scenarios (Turoff et al 2004). 
Scenarios are relevant if they represent a development with significant impact on 
the current strategy or planning and would – if they were true – require a change. 
Additionally, scenarios need to be credible and understandable. Credibility can be 
derived by verifiability and reliability of the source (Schoemaker, 1993). To balance 
timeliness and potential impact versus credibility, precision and granularity, informa-
tion management should make trade-offs transparent at run-time by explicitly chal-
lenging the adequacy of the information and the constraints on the process (Comes, 
Wijngaards & Van de Walle, 2014).  
Disaster responders operate under pressure and strain, including risks for personal 
safety and well being of responders on-site. Personal experience and trusted social 
networks play therefore an important role. As trust often is not transmitted across 
networks, this leads to a plethora of redundant pieces of information that is collected 
and processed individually, instead of being shared between different responding 
communities. It is also often difficult to codify and communicate knowledge that is 
only applicable to very specific situations. That is why scenarios are appropriate for 
expressing tacit knowledge (Kim 1998). Not everyone has the same experience with 
respect to a crisis situation since such events are relatively rare (King 2002), resulting 
in different reactions of professional responders and population affected. Tacit know-
ledge can be acquired only through experience such as observation, imitation, and 
practice (Kim 1998). Again, in the words of Jesper Lund: 
“Disaster management is experience. And common sense.” 
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Information is typically perceived as credible when it matches the expectations or 
experiences of decision-makers (Schoemaker, 1993). In case a scenario flags a risk 
that is emerging and unexpected, it is essential to annotate the information with the 
source (reliability by expertise) or the process that was used to derive the information 
(verifiability). Moreover, the information needs to be represented in an understanda-
ble way, making potential cause-effect chains explicit (Comes et al., 2012).  
3.2 Providing Information, not Data 
As Sebastian Rhodes-Stampa stated for the humanitarian response efforts he was 
coordinating in Tacloban, information needs could be very different depending who 
requested the information, and for what purpose. Along with the increasing availabili-
ty of information management, expectations rose about the availability of detailed 
data. This lead to the need to manage an ever increasing amount of data, maps and 
situation reports in various levels of temporal and geographical detail. In his words: 
“Granularity is the word of this emergency.” 
Instead of juxtaposing the same information at different levels of detail, scenarios 
should be tailored for specific decisions and address decision-makers’ needs to avoid 
information overload, redundancies or the wrong level of granularity. A strategic 
series of scenarios might for instance include the needs of the population as they are 
and explore the impact of disaster relief supplies as a basis for the planning of huma-
nitarian logistics. On a more operational level, scenarios can support coordination by 
presenting information about the current projects and the future presence of aid organ-
izations (building on the so-called Who-What-Where or 3W database), and comple-
menting the efforts with numbers of population and potential migration patterns.  
To support sensemaking each scenario should present an understandable develop-
ment of the situation; i.e., processed information including cause-effect chains rather 
than raw data. The form and type of information depends on the decision-makers’ 
preferences, their access to technology (such as internet connection, bandwidth or 
printers) and the time available. Distributed techniques for scenario construction 
(Comes, Wijngaards & Van de Walle, 2014) enable the integration of experts from 
various agencies and authorities, bringing together local experts, professional res-
ponders, volunteers that work onsite or remotely (such as the Digital Humanitarian 
Network, a global network of volunteers), and scientists with different backgrounds.  
3.3 Addressing the Dynamics 
It takes time to collect and process data; to share and communicate information; and 
to derive an understanding of the problem, construct scenarios and make a decision. 
This is particularly true if a consensus must be found among different responding 
actors and organizations. In the very initial phase of humanitarian response, informa-
tion is typically far from complete, yet the urgency of the response necessitates action  
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nevertheless. As André Pacquet from the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and responsible for operations in the heavily affected town of Guiuan put it: 
“We accept chaos to start operations.” 
As time passes, the information about the problem and the perception thereof can 
change. Hence, continuous revisions and corrections are necessary while considering 
the scarcity of resources available for sensemaking and to support the decision-
makers. Therefore, scenario updates need to be conducted in an efficient and respon-
sive manner (Comes, Wijngaards & Schultmann, 2012).  
To this end, two aspects need to be respected: relevance and validity. In the context 
of updating, relevance is assessed in terms of the potential consequences of neglecting 
the new information. It is therefore necessary to assess if the new information is ‘rele-
vant enough’ to justify the updating effort. Similarly, already collected information 
that is still ‘sufficiently valid’ should be reused. A scenario update can be informa-
tional or structural: information updates may change the measured or forecasted value 
of a variable, or its likelihood. A structural update requires mechanisms that account 
for a change in the basis for sensemaking or the evaluation and ranking of alterna-
tives. This is for instance the case, when new impact factors are identified as the un-
derstanding about the problem grows, or as expert’s previously implicit assumptions 
become more explicit. 
4 Avoid Risk Accelerators: An Agenda for Humanitarian 
Information Management and Systems 
Our approach to manage information and support decision-makers who are facing 
wicked problems in complex environments can be summarized by answering the two 
questions posed in the introduction. 
Ad 1: Information Systems Design. The behavior of complex systems cannot be 
predicted and information is imperfect. The difficulty of assessing the consequences 
of a decision and prioritizing alternatives is compounded by a tendency to simplify 
the problem and neglect the lack of knowledge (Pathak et al. 2007). To support deci-
sion-makers who face complexity, we propose the use of scenarios to systematically 
explore harmful future developments. This entails continuous sensemaking and seek-
ing to identify risk drivers as they emerge, while evaluating and continuously adapt-
ing disaster response strategies. The interpretive information processing mechanisms 
that are commonly called “intuition” or “experience” need to be supported by appro-
priate information systems. As Weick (1995) put it, “we need to understand more 
about Sensemaking Support Systems as well as Decision Support Systems, which 
means we need to know more about what is being supported”. We have referred earli-
er to the DERMIS design premises as introduced by Turoff et al. (2004) providing a 
framework for the design of Humanitarian Information Management Systems. 
Ad 2: Scenario Construction. Given limitations in time, effort, and resources, scena-
rio construction and design of information products should be guided towards those 
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that most significantly distinguish advantages and drawbacks of promising alterna-
tives or the currently implemented strategies. To understand and detect potential 
flaws, we use scenarios for probing in a way that is targeted to identify the most criti-
cal potential problems while respecting constraints in terms of sufficient plausibility 
and credibility. To embrace the dynamics of a situation, and potentially swift system 
changes, information systems need to provide updating procedures to efficiently inte-
grate new information and support sensemaking and decision-making on the basis of 
the latest understanding of the situation. 
Inherent to the complexity of the situation, no method can guarantee to find all crit-
ical and loss-prone risks or risk drivers, and to communicate them at the right time to 
the decision-makers. Yet, in contrast to most modeling and statistical techniques, our 
method aims at identifying these drivers by referring to professionals, local or remote 
experts and scientists with different backgrounds to actively challenge current mind-
sets for critical sensemaking and robust decisions. By referring to different experts per 
piece of information, we aim at avoiding groupthink and, to some extent, the confir-
mation bias: experts can creatively think at an individual level about what might go 
wrong. 
To choose and prioritize information products and scenarios, the following ques-
tions need to be addressed: 
 Number of information products to be selected: how can the trade-off be made 
between a thorough exploration and the constraints on time and resources 
available? 
 Similarity: how can the similarity or difference of information products and 
scenarios be measured in the context of sensemaking and decision support?  
 Reliability: how can the plausibility and reliability of scenarios, which com-
bine information of different type and quality, be assessed and continuously 
updated as new information becomes available? 
 Relevance and selection: how can the most relevant information products be 
constructed, and how to select a good representative taking into account scena-
rio similarity and reliability?  
Each of these questions opens up fields and directions for future research. When 
designing information systems to answer these questions, it is vital that the decision-
makers’ needs and the constraints of sudden onset disasters are respected. If the reali-
ties of operations are not valued, frustration with the systems may lead to worka-
rounds and the parallel existence of official reporting and information management 
and direct and direct communications within the respective networks. For instance, 
Sebastian Rhodes-Stampa expressed his views as follows: 
“Provide simple messages, don’t overcomplicate stuff. Right now we are victims of 
our own black magic of sophisticated systems.”  
The characteristics that need to be taken into account include, among others,  
the time available before a decision has to be made, and the authority to make it; the 
requirements of accessibility of information and interoperability of systems; the avail-
ability of local experts; the quality of information that local or remote experts, or au-
tomated systems can provide; the current workload; and the sensitivity of the experts’ 
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assessments to a change in input information. In this manner, future information sys-
tems can be designed so that they support decision-makers who are confronted with 
an increasing number of increasingly complex disasters. 
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